U.S. Policy on Artsakh Independence | Peace & Freedom
POLICY
ANCA's goal is to generate increased U.S. support for the Artsakh Republic—in principle, policy, and practice—for the continued independence of the Artsakh region, through initiatives challenging Azerbaijan’s aggression, strengthening U.S.-Artsakh ties, appropriating direct U.S. aid for Artsakh, and supporting the OSCE Minsk Group’s efforts to resolve the Artsakh-Azerbaijan conflicts, status, and security issues.
PRIORITIES
U.S. House passage of the bipartisan U.S.-Artsakh Travel and Communication Resolution, H.Res.190.
Continued Congressional delegations to Artsakh, and regular Artsakh delegation visits to Washington, DC.
U.S. support for Artsakh’s full and formal return to all OSCE and other peace talks.
U.S. pressure on Azerbaijan to stop obstructing implementation of OSCE-backed Royce-Engel proposals.
U.S. prohibition on the direct or third-party sale/transfer of U.S. military equipment or technology to Azerbaijan.
U.S. opposition to Azerbaijan’s WTO candidacy, eligibility for GSP, and any preferential trade or tax treatment, as long as Baku blockades, boycotts, or attacks Armenia or Artsakh.
U.S. Senate scrutiny of the next U.S. nominee to serve as Ambassador to Azerbaijan.
U.S. state-level recognition of Artsakh, beyond California, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, and Rhode Island.
RESULTS
Secured passage of the Chu Amendment (2019) endorsing the Royce-Engel peace proposals, calling for the non-deployment of snipers, heavy arms, and new weapons; deployment of additional OSCE monitors, and placement of gunfire-locators along the line-of-contact.
Secured passage of the Sherman Amendment (2019) placing legislative limits on U.S. defense sales or transfers to Azerbaijan that would strengthen Baku’s ability to act upon its stated intention to shoot down civilian aircraft over Artsakh.
Broke down barriers to U.S.-Artsakh ties by encouraging and facilitating bilateral visits (to Washington, DC and Stepanakert) and building bipartisan support for the U.S.-Artsakh Travel and Communication Resolution, H.Res.190.
Supported the success of Capitol Hill events featuring leaders of the Artsakh Republic.
Spearheaded direct U.S. aid to Artsakh in the Fiscal Year 1998 foreign aid bill. The U.S. is the only country that provides direct aid (over $45,000,000) to help Artsakh with maternal health care, clean water, and de-mining.
Supported passage of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (1992), requiring that Azerbaijan take “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”
Stopped Matt Bryza’s ill-advised nomination (2010) to serve as Ambassador to Azerbaijan due to his pro-Aliyev bias, a principled stand that earned the ANCA attacks by the editorial boards of the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal.
Challenged the pro-Azerbaijan Madrid Principles, which call upon Artsakh to make reckless, up-front, irrevocable strategic/territorial concessions in return for deferred, vague, and reversible promises from Azerbaijan.
Leveraged political, policy, and legal avenues to block a potential Israeli sale (2017) of the advanced Iron Dome weapons system to Azerbaijan during the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Reframed the Artsakh issue away from the reckless “land now” for (possibly) “status later” dynamic, toward a focus on peace (via the Royce-Engel proposals) and dialogue (via the U.S.-Artsakh Travel and Communication Resolution).
Worked to secure state-level recognition of the Artsakh Republic by California, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, and Rhode Island.
ANCA's goal is to generate increased U.S. support for the Artsakh Republic—in principle, policy, and practice—for the continued independence of the Artsakh region, through initiatives challenging Azerbaijan’s aggression, strengthening U.S.-Artsakh ties, appropriating direct U.S. aid for Artsakh, and supporting the OSCE Minsk Group’s efforts to resolve the Artsakh-Azerbaijan conflicts, status, and security issues.
PRIORITIES
U.S. House passage of the bipartisan U.S.-Artsakh Travel and Communication Resolution, H.Res.190.
Continued Congressional delegations to Artsakh, and regular Artsakh delegation visits to Washington, DC.
U.S. support for Artsakh’s full and formal return to all OSCE and other peace talks.
U.S. pressure on Azerbaijan to stop obstructing implementation of OSCE-backed Royce-Engel proposals.
U.S. prohibition on the direct or third-party sale/transfer of U.S. military equipment or technology to Azerbaijan.
U.S. opposition to Azerbaijan’s WTO candidacy, eligibility for GSP, and any preferential trade or tax treatment, as long as Baku blockades, boycotts, or attacks Armenia or Artsakh.
U.S. Senate scrutiny of the next U.S. nominee to serve as Ambassador to Azerbaijan.
U.S. state-level recognition of Artsakh, beyond California, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, and Rhode Island.
RESULTS
Secured passage of the Chu Amendment (2019) endorsing the Royce-Engel peace proposals, calling for the non-deployment of snipers, heavy arms, and new weapons; deployment of additional OSCE monitors, and placement of gunfire-locators along the line-of-contact.
Secured passage of the Sherman Amendment (2019) placing legislative limits on U.S. defense sales or transfers to Azerbaijan that would strengthen Baku’s ability to act upon its stated intention to shoot down civilian aircraft over Artsakh.
Broke down barriers to U.S.-Artsakh ties by encouraging and facilitating bilateral visits (to Washington, DC and Stepanakert) and building bipartisan support for the U.S.-Artsakh Travel and Communication Resolution, H.Res.190.
Supported the success of Capitol Hill events featuring leaders of the Artsakh Republic.
Spearheaded direct U.S. aid to Artsakh in the Fiscal Year 1998 foreign aid bill. The U.S. is the only country that provides direct aid (over $45,000,000) to help Artsakh with maternal health care, clean water, and de-mining.
Supported passage of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (1992), requiring that Azerbaijan take “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”
Stopped Matt Bryza’s ill-advised nomination (2010) to serve as Ambassador to Azerbaijan due to his pro-Aliyev bias, a principled stand that earned the ANCA attacks by the editorial boards of the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal.
Challenged the pro-Azerbaijan Madrid Principles, which call upon Artsakh to make reckless, up-front, irrevocable strategic/territorial concessions in return for deferred, vague, and reversible promises from Azerbaijan.
Leveraged political, policy, and legal avenues to block a potential Israeli sale (2017) of the advanced Iron Dome weapons system to Azerbaijan during the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Reframed the Artsakh issue away from the reckless “land now” for (possibly) “status later” dynamic, toward a focus on peace (via the Royce-Engel proposals) and dialogue (via the U.S.-Artsakh Travel and Communication Resolution).
Worked to secure state-level recognition of the Artsakh Republic by California, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, and Rhode Island.
